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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis was to perform a conceptual
study of using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in amphibious
operations. It focused on the command relations, tasking and
critical problems in UAV amphibious operations. This thesis
investigated the question of whether using UAVs at sea is a
feasible complement to current amphibious operational doctrine
and, if so, then what expense is incurred to assets on which
it is embarked and assigned to the Amphibious Ready Group.
This thesis concluded that UAVs were a feasible complement
to current amphibious doctrine, but several critical issues to
include EMI, video distribution and air space management, had
to be investigate further. Additionally, topics for future
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In recent years, several changes in the technologies and
economics associated with combat have significantly changed
the character of modern warfare. The primary reason for these
rapid changes has been the recent development of high
technology/high lethality weapons and their respective
proliferation among nations which represent both friend and
foe in the Third World. With the American reorientation
toward low intensity conflict in peripheral regional conflicts
worldwide and the need to use every possible force multiplier
for both political and economic reasons, providing high
quality weapon targeting intelligence while not exposing
expensive manned reconnaissance platforms has become
imperative. One significant development has been low
altitude, antiaircraft weapons. These weapons are
exceptionally portable, easy to use, and represent a
significant probability of hit and kill. They made a
significant difference in Afghanistan. The proliferation of
these weapons worldwide has made a cheaper reconnaissance
platform not only desirous but almost a necessity in today's
tactical, political, and economic environment.
3.
The clearest and most elucidating example of a modern,
logistically sophisticated army being stalemated by a Third
World nation is the Afghanistan War. In this conflict, the
Soviet Army's inability to effect a logistical and Close Air
Support (CAS) mission had a synergistic effect which was the
cause of their ultimate political stalemate - both
internationally and internally - with Afghanistan.
In the field, the Soviet Army was eventually unable to
resupply their forces by air or protect them with close air
support. Due to the geography of Afghanistan and the nature
of the American-supported guerrilla forces, it was absolutely
imperative for the Soviets to maintain distant forward
operating bases from which to strike. Once aerial resupply
and close air support were inhibited, the guerrillas could
move forces safely and exert their combat power at a decisive
point on a weakened and isolated enemy. By making many Soviet
aerial missions too risky, many operations were forced onto
the Afghanistan road network where guerrillas hold a distinct
advantage. Through the use of high technology Stinger and SA-
7 missiles, the Soviets were forced into withdrawal. An
inexpensive Soviet non-armed aerial platform which could
provide accurate and timely intelligence while remaining an
elusive target was never found.
As the result of America's experiences and knowledge
gained in Afghanistan, Central America, Africa and other
nations' low intensity conflicts, the United States initiated
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actions which could significantly reduce its political and
economic vulnerabilities while enhancing its tactical
intelligence collection capability. At congressional urging,
the Department of Defense (DOD) has initiated the DOD Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Development Program. ±i'ais program serves
as the central point from which all service-specific programs
are coordinated and/or directed.
B. SCOPE
The purpose of this thesis is to perform a conceptual
study of using UAVs in amphibious operations. It will focus
on the command relations, tasking and critical problems in UAV
amphibious operations. Current doctrine in the United States
Marine Corps is focused primarily on land-based UAV
operations. In fact, during exercise Team Spirit 1993, the
UAV company participating in the exercise never embarked on a
ship. This thesis will investigate the question of whether
using UAVs at sea is a feasible complement to current
amphibious operational doctrine and, if so, then what expense
is incurred to assets on which it is embarked and assigned to
the Amphibious Ready Group. This thesis is intended for an
audience that is familiar with amphibious warfare doctrine and
electromagnetic comnmunications theory. This thesis will draw
heavily from Marine Corps doctrine, personnel experience as a




Chapter II will provide a generic description of a UAV.
Chapter III will address possible threats to UAV. Chapter IV
will discuss in detail the possible missions of UAVs while
conducting amphibious operations. C2 aspects of UAVs in
amphibious warfare will be discussed in chapter V. A
discussion of critical issues that need to be addressed if
UAVs are to reach their maximum effectiveness will be provided
in chapter VI. Chapter VI will only address three of the most
imperative critical issues that the author feels need to be
addressed in order to optimize UAV operations. Other issues
that were not discussed in the paper will be offered in
chapter VII, the summary/recommendation chapter, as a bases
for further study.
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II. UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
A. DEFINITION
A UAV is defined as a powered vehicle that:
"* Does not carry a human operator
"• Uses aerodynamic lift forces
"* Has the capability to fly autonomously or piloted remotely
"* Can be expendable or recoverable
"* Can carry a lethal or no-lethal payload
By physically disassociating the pilot from the aircraft, a
force commander is able to limit hazards of aircraft crew
members and therefore significantly reduce political and
economic exposure a nation must endure on the battlefield.
Cruise missiles, artillery projectiles, ballistic vehicles and
semi-ballistic vehicles are not considered to be UAVs.
[Ref. l:p. 1-1) This thesis will use this broad aefinition of
a UAV to investigate the concept of using UAVs in amphibious
operations.
Although UAVs allow a nation's forces to reduce
vulnerabilities while putting a reconnaissance platform into
an area of interest, the UAV is uniquely able to add to the
5
capability of real time surveillance/collection for an
air/ground/sea commander. This enhancement allows commanders
to complete the operational assessment and planning process
while continuously updating themselves and their subordinates
to a degree never before seen. Because of this ability, UAVs
are force multipliers which enaole a commander to make more
informed and timely decisions that should allow him to exert
the combat power at a critical time and place. Additionally,
UAVs have the capability to provide a variety of operational
missions that include, but are not limited to:
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA);
Electronic Warfare (EW); Electronic Signal Measures (ESM);
mine detection; command and control; and special operations
support roles. UAVs are particularly suited for
environmentally prohibitive missions (missions into anid near
areas contaminated by Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
material), missions which require extreme physical endurance,
and those missions in which the loss of aircraft and/or air
crew is probable or politically unacceptable. By using UAVs,
a commander can allocate his remaining manned aircraft for
missions which require on-site human jidgement and
versatility.
B. PROGRAM STATUS
In 1988, Congress directed the DOD to consolidate the
management of nonlethal UAV programs. Shortly thereafter, DOD
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formed a UAV Executive Committee and designated the United
States Navy as Executive Service. The DOD also formed a UAV
Joint Project Office (JPO) to consolidate the research and
development and acquisition efforts of the services. In 1991,
the DOD further refined the oversight structure by replacing
the UAV Executive Committee with the Defense Acquisition Board
(DAB). Through the UAV JPO organizational efforts, the UAV
has four distinct class categories: Close Range, Short Range,
Medium Range, and Endurance. Table 1 [Ref. 2:p. 13]
summarized the mission parameters of these four categories.
The Close Range UAV is currently proceeding toward a
planned milestone decision review scheduled for the fourth
quarter of FY 93. Additionally, the Close Range Program
Office plans to release Requests For Proposals (RFPs) for the
common and downsized mission control station hardware and
award both contracts this year.
The Short Range UAV has completed its early test and
development. In December 1992, IAI's status as prime
contractor was switched with TRW and the contract awarded.
Currently, the low rate production option to TRW and IAI is in
progress. The Navy currently plans to procure 18 systems of
eight air vehicles per system during calendar year 1994.
[Ref. 3:p. 1]
The first Medium Range UAV was launched in May 1992 from
an air platform. A second launch was conducted in July 1992
demonstrating autonomous flight, imaginary collection and
7
TABLE 1: Summary of UAV Family Mission Parameters
CLOSE SHORT MEDIUM ENDURANCE
OPERATIONAL NEEDS AS TA TS LW MET, AS TA IS. MET NBC PRE.ANO POST STRIKE AS 7A C2 MET NBC
NBC C2. LW AECONNAISSANCE SIGINT LWTA SPECIAL 0'S
LAUNCH AND LANDrSHIPBQARD LANDSHIPBOARO A#FIRANO NOT SPECIFIED
RECOVERY
RADIUS OF ACTION NONE STATED 150KM BEYOND C"0 KM CLA6SSIFIEDFORWARD LINE OF
OwN TROOPS lFLOT' ___________
SPEED NOT SPECIFIED DASH4 .0 10 KNOTS S50 KNOTS . 20 00071 NOT SPECIFIED
CRUISE .S90KNOTS 0 MACH .20 000 FT
ENDURANCE 24 NAS CONTINUOUS ITO 12HI4S 2 HAS 24 HAS ON STATION
COVE RAGE 
___________
INFOMATIN NAA.AFAL.TIME NLAM ALE M NfAA.REAL.TIMEFJ NEAR-REAL-TIME
,MLINESS RECORDED
SENson TYPE DAYINIGHT IMAGING' OAYfN1014T IMAGING* DAYINIGH'I IMAGING' SIGINT MET COMM
L'W NBC DATA ALLAY. COMM SIGINT. MET. LW RELAY DATA RLLAY.
RELAY RADAA NBC IMAGING
SIGITu MET, MASINT. MASINT. LW
TO. LW
AIR VEHICLE CONTROL NONE STATED PRE.PROGRAMMED, PRL.PROGRAMMED, PRE.PROGRAMMED,
REMOTE RE6MOTE
GROUND STATION VEHICLE A SHIP VEHI1CLE A SHIP ISIPS 1PROCESSING) VEHICLE A SHI1P
DATA LINK WORLD WIDE PEACE WORLD WIDE PEACE JSIPS INTEROPERAU1LE WORLD WIDE PEACE
TIME USAGE. TIME USAGE. WORLD WIDE PEACE TIME USAGE.
ANTI..JAbA CAPPRIOLT AIT14AV CAPABILITY 11IME USAGE. A~NI-JAM CAPABILITY
ANITIAM CAPABILITY
CREW SIZE MINIMUM MINIMUM MINIMUM - - IMINIMUM
SERVICE NHEDM USA USN. USMC USA. USAI. USMIC USN. USAF. USUC USA. USN. USMC
REOUIRE MEN?
C2.COMMAND AND CONTROL
[w . ELECTAONIC WARFARE
j51pS . JOWT SERpiCE IMAGERY PROCESSING SYSTEM
MASINT. MEASUREMENT AND SIGNATIURES INTELLIGENCE
MET - METEOROL.OGY
NBC - NLUCLEAR. BIOLOGICAL wd CHEMICAL RECONNAISSANCE
RSE- RECONkAMESANCE AND SUR4VEILLANCE
SIGINi'. SIGNALS INTELLJGENCE
TA . TARGE~T ACOUtSITON
IS - TARGET SPOTTING
TID TARGET DESIGNATOR
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airborne recovery of the vehicle. The Medium Range UAV is
currently proceeding with both risk-reduction and engineering
and manufacturing development. However, the Navy support of
this program has been suspended. (Ref 3:p. 1]
The UAV Special Study Group (SSG) Working Group is
considering a joint Operational Requirements Document (ORD)
for an Endurance UAV. The UAV Joint Program Office is
contributing to this effort as well as monitoring other
Endurance UAV program initiatives.
The Pioneer short range vehicle is currently fielded by
the Navy, Army, and Marine Corps. It was purchased as an
interim fill for the UAV requirement. The Navy will continue
to purchase Pioneer until the proposed short range UAV is
ready for fielding. The Navy intends to purchase an
additional four systems of five air vehicles each.
(Ref. 3:p. 2]
The proposed family of UAVs will provide commanders the
flexibility and capability they need in the modern battle
space. The family provides a logical progressive increase in
capabilities and range to satisfy current and projected
missions.
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III. THREATS TO UAVs
This chapter discusses the threat to UAVs in the modern
battlefield. The threat to UAVs is currently quite similar to
other low technology/low performance/low altitude aircraft.
Moreover, because of the UAVs reliance on its vital electronic
control links and the UAVs inability to actively
maneuver/defend itself, it is easier to attack and defeat than
a similar sized aircraft. However, some UAVs have a reduced
radar, infrared, and acoustic signature because of reduced
weight. This greatly reduces the enemy's ability to detect
and track the vehicle. Therefore, it is markedly more
difficult to engage with weapon systems. Additionally,
because of the UAVs diminutive physical size, it is extremely
difficult to track with visually tracked systems. These
characteristics should enhance the UAVs ability to survive in
areas of enemy anti-air operations. This chapter will
describe the threats that exist to UAVs in low intensity
conflict, electronic warfare environments, enemy air
environments and possible future weapons. [Ref. 2:p. 2-1)
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A. LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT
With the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the United
States emerging as the only global superpower, it can be
anticipated that modern UAVs will be exposed to mostly low to
mid intensity conflicts. In conflicts such as these, the
major threat to UAVs will be from Anti-Aircraft Artillery
(AAA) and small ground-based conventional arms used in an ad
hoc air defense mode. Because of its reduced radar cross-
section, the UAV will probably be detected by its acoustic
signal initially which then cues enemy personnel.
As radar technology improves and becomes proliferated
among Third World nations, it can be expected that UAVs will
be detected more easily by radar at increased distances. This
will greatly increase the enemy's reaction time and,
therefore, enable our enemies to engage our UAVs with Surface-
to-Air Missiles (SAM). [Ref. 4:p. 2-1]
B. ELECTRONIC WARFARE
UA" operations are also vulnerable to Electronic Warfare
(EW). Our enemies can be expected to focus their efforts at
the systems controlling the UAV and the products/information
which the UAV is sending back to friendly forces. Without
operational data links, the UAV's mission is pointless.
Ground-based, shipborne, and airborne (helicopter and fixed-
wing) platforms can be expected to carry out the enemy's EW
11
program.
During a typical UAV mission, it can be expected that the
vehicle will spend considerable time loitering over enemy
territory. Because of this, the UAV will be physically closer
to enemy jamming capabilities than its own control station.
This geometry greatly increases the threat of enemy EW. The
enemy will be able to jam the UAV with smaller amounts of
power than would normally be used to jam units in friendly
territory. [Ref. 4:p. 2-1]
C. ENEMY AIR
Because of the UAV's excellent anti-detection
characteristics, the threat from enemy aircraft is relatively
limited. However, once the UAV's capabilities and
characteristics are more widely disseminated, a realignment of
enemy capabilities and resources can be expected. UAVs have
a similar flight profile to helicopters. Therefore, it can be
expected that they will also have a similar air threat profile
as well. Current anticipated enemy helicopters possess a very
limited anti-air cap-,bility; however, many nations are
developing attack helicopters with a more potent air-to-air
intercept mission. When combined with their light weight and
maneuverability, these weapons platforms can pose a
significant threat to UAVs. Fixed-wing aircraft with anti-air
capabilities already pose a threat to UAVs that ha-e been
detected and tracked. Time and technology will only increase
12
the air threat to UAVs. [Ref. 4:p. 2-1]
D. FUTURE WEAPONS
Directed energy weapons, such as lasers, electromagnetic
pulse weapons, microwave weapons, and particle beam weapons,
could also pose a threat to future UAV operations. Currently,
these and other technologies are under development in a number
of countries. The threat to the UAV from these weapons will
be proportional to the enemy's level of development and the
previous success of UAV operations in the long run.
[Ref. 4:p. 2-1]
E. SUMMARY OF THREATS
It can be stated, that there exists no credible threat to
UAVs now or in the foreseeable future. Until our anticipated
enemies realign their forces, UAVs have a window of
opportunity that can be exploited. It is imperative that the
U.S. design and field systems that will exploit this window
and be prepared for anticipated enemy aggression.
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IV. MISSIONS OF UAVs
This chapter discusses the current mission capabilities of
the existing short-range UAV system and the anticipated growth
in missions with future UAV payloads.
A. EXISTING MISSIONS
The current short-range UAV, the Pioneer, has a very
limited payload. The payload consists of one daytime
television camera/lens zoom system and one Forward-Looking
Infrared (FLIR) night sensor system (Ref. 2:p. 3-7]. These
two sensors provide the Pioneer with a basic day/night
observation capability for the Marine Air Ground Task Force
(MAGTF) commander. Because of the low
capability/unsophisticated nature of the sensing systems in
the payload, the results are subject to all the variabilities
that obstruct simple aerial television and infrared (IR)
imagery sensing systems. The two primary deficiencies of the
daytime TV and nighttime FLIR systems are that poor weather
conditions can easily obstruct the UAV's field of view and
deny lack of adequate temperature gradients for the FLIR.
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As limited as this system may appear to some observers,
it can readily provide valuable, high quality overhead imagery
to the MAGTF commander. Consequently, the MAGTF, Air Combat
Element, or Ground Combat Element commanders task the UAV-SR
systems to perform multiple and varying types of
reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA)
missions. These missions include, but are not limited to:
"* Adjusting close/deep air support missions
"* Adjusting all types of indirect fire missions
"* Route reconnaissance for landing force, tactical and
logistical
"* Beach and landing zone surveillance
"* Battle damage assessment [Ref. 5:p. 1]
During operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Pioneer
UAVs successfully accomplished the missions listed above. The
Pioneers were by both land-based units and by battleship
detachments. In both employment schemes, the UAV proved to be
an invaluable asset in conducting RSTA missions during an
amphibious operation. Their ability to stealthily approach
enemy positions and transmit real-time imagery back to the
requesting unit earned rave reviews from those who benefited
from the Pioneer capabilities.
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B. FUTURE MISSIONS
In the near-term future, with the development of
newer/higher technology UAV platforms and payloads, the
Amphibious Task Force/MAGTF commander will have the ability to
perform additional missions not currently available on present
UAV platforms. Several of the new mission packages that are
currently under development for the UAV are as follows:
"* Radio relay capability between two ground stations or
another UAV
"• Target designation capability of modern precision weapons
"* Mine detection reporting operational capability
"* Nuclear, biological and chemical (NCB) warfare
detection/reporting capability
"* Electronic warfare capabilities
"• Electronic countermeasure capabilities
"• Synthetic aperture radar sensing systems for the
enhancement of RSTA missions [Ref. 4:p.l]
These new mission packages should greatly enhance the
MAGTF's commanders ability to wage war without risking
friendly forces to enemy fire.
C. SYSTEMS WITH SIMILAR MISSION CAPABILITIES AS UAVs
UAVs are not the only systems that can perform the
missions described earlier with regard to amphibious
operations. Both the CLF and CATF have access to organic and
16








"* Electronic warfare aircraft
"* Aircraft with an NBC detection capability
These assets would compete with the UAV for missions. The
commanders, through their designated representatives, are
responsible for determining the mission allocation. The UAV's
primary attribute is its ability to fight into hostile
environment with out the threat of loss of life to the pilot.
It can be expected then that UAVs will be reserved for
dangerous areas as discussed earlier.
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V.COMMAND AND CONTROL ASPECTS OF UAVS IN AMPHIBIOUS
OPERATIONS
This chapter discusses the command and control (C2)
aspects of short range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV-SR)
operations in the two distinct and separately controlled
phases of an amphibious operation. It includes a discussion
on command authority, tasking agencies, task routing, manning,
types of missions and factors affecting UAV availability.
To understand UAV requirements, tasking and collection
procedures, a basic understanding of amphibious operations is
required. Upon the assignment of an amphibious operation by
a Theater or Fleet Commander, a Commander Amphibious Task
Force (CATF) is designated and task force amphibious units are
assigned. The CATF, a Navy officer, commands all Naval,
Marine, and other Service units assigned to the task force.
The CATF is responsible for the training, embarkation,
transport, support, and control of air and naval gunfire
support until command of amphibious forces is transferred
ashore. Subordinate to the CATF in this phase is the
Commander Landing Force (CLF). The CLF is a Marine officer
assigned by the Theater or Fleet Commander. The CLF is
responsible for the training, coordination, combat service
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support and logistical support of the landing force. Upon the
establishment of a beachhead and the debarkation of the
Landing Force's indirect fire weapons, the command of the
operation is shifted ashore with the CLF. Because of the
complexity of shifting command in an amphibious operation,
control of many assets and units becomes difficult. UAVs are
no exception. A smooth shift in command and ensuing control
is essential for UAVs to fulfill their full potential.
A. CATF CONTROLLED UAVs
In an amphibious operation where Marine Corps units are
embarked aboard amphibious shipping, the operational control
remains in the hands of the CATF. The CATF is responsible for
the planning, training and execution of all pre-assault UAV
missions. The majority of these missions will be flown in
direct support of CLF intelligence requirements -the Essential
Elements of Information (EEI's) established by the CLF. It is
during this period that CATF/CLF staff coordination must be
efficient and effective to adequately meet the intelligence
requirements of both commanOers. Requirements and therefore
taskiig for embarked/assigned UAV organizations will
continually change as the enemy, weather, and tactical
situations change. UAVs are well suited for Maneuver Warfare.
Their quick responsiveness and RSTA capability fit the high
tempo of operations required in this warfare doctrine. While
19
embarked, tasking for information which requires a UAV
collection effort should pass from the requesting unit to the
CATF, and finally to embarked Navy UAV units. It would be in
the Marine Corps' best interest that Marine personnel be made
available to assist the Navy operators for UAV missions flown
by the Navy in support of the Marine Corps. This would
greatly reduce the chance of misinterpretation at the operator
level. In the situation where no Navy UAV assets are assigned
or available due to heavy tasking, embarked/assigned Marine
units could be utilized to accomplish both CLF and CATF
requirements. This is the focus of the rest of the thesis.
Throughout this process, it is imperative that all
planning and coordination of UAVs be accomplished through the
Supporting Arms Coordination Center (SACC) and Tactical Air
Control Center (TACC). Information requirements and
intelligence derived from flights should always be channeled
through the Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) to eliminate
duplication of effort, to pair requirements with the most
effective platform, and to ensure target compromise does not
occur. (Ref. 5 :p. 6]
The SACC is the center hub for close air support request
and tasking. The TACC is the agency that coordinates the air
control within the battle space. The JIC is the focal point
for intelligence request and processing.
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1. Missions of CATF Controlled UAVs
The types of missions which can be accomplished
through CATF assignment are as varied as CLF intelligence/fire
support control requirements. The Operational Maneuver From
The Sea Concept is the application of Maneuver Warfare
principles to the maritime portion of a theater campaign. The
concept takes advantage of the expanding capabilities of
modern naval and landing forces to project power ashore.
(Ref. 6:p. 1] UAVs have the capability to enhance a force's
effectiveness under this concept.
In the pre-assault phase of an amphibious landing, UAVs
can be used as communications relays, overhead imagery,
countermine warfare, anti-submarine actions, meteorological
surveys, and NBC detection. Once the assault phase is
initiated, Navy UAVs should be shifted towards land based
areas of interest so as to provide their capabilities toward
the accomplishment of power projection ashore. Figure 1
[Ref. 7:p. 22] depicts the blue water phase where UAV focus
goes from fleet protection to Marine tasking. The diagram
depicts UAVs being used to target enemy positions ashore and
providing imagery data to command element.
Re-tasking of Navy UAVs is critical to exploiting the
enemy's weaknesses. UAV re-tasking greatly enhances the
Marine's Maneuver Warfare concepts since minimal forces can be











(Ref. 7:p. 23] depicts the green water battle with UAVs during
the initial stages of the attack. A portion of UAV assets
will be used to ensure the securing of a beach/air head and
will also be used at the initial insert point. The UAV's
primary mission is to provide imagery to the CATF for
exploitation ashore such as target designation and photo
intelligence.
Figure 3 [Ref. 7:p. 24] depicts the amphibious assault
phase. In this phase, the preponderance of UAV assets are
used for shore exploitation. Enemy ground installations are
being targeted and observed for friendly force engagements.
CATF operations are design to support the amphibious task
force and its power projection ashore. The different phases
clearly demonstrate the progression of forces inland in
attempt to land friendly forces and gain control of enemy
territory.
B. CLF CONTROLLED UAVs
Once ashore, the CLF will have operational control over
his Marine Corps UAV assets. Command, Control, and
logistical/administrative control of each Marine UAV Company
is handled by a Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence
Group (SRIG). Each Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) has
assigned to it an SRIG which is responsible for all MEF level
intelligence collection, production, and dissemination. An
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Service Support Group, and MEF command element. Marine
expeditionary commands are, primarily, task originated in
Marine Expeditionary Brigades, (MEB), Marine Expeditionary
Unit (MEU), and Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Forces
(SPMAGTF). Each Marine commander will enjoy full authority,
responsibility, and accountability for any UAV assets
assigned. As such, the CLF has the ability to assign missions
and priorities to his UAV assets once ashore. These missions
will be accounted for on the Air Tasking Order to ensure
proper coordination. Navy UAVs will be used to support the
CLF whenever possible.
1. CLF Controlled Mission Planning
Mission planning is critical to proper
employment/mission accomplishment for all requirements which
can be met through the use of UAVs. The most advantageous
method of mission planning used by the Marine Air-Ground Task
Forces (MAGTF) is the preplanned mission. Unfortunately,
warfare is, by its nature, not easily predictable. Because of
this fact, immediate missions are to be expected as well.
Both are described below.
a. Preplanned Missions
Preplanned missions are those missions planned in
advance around intelligence/fire support requirements and
other asset activities. The UAV Company representative
consolidates all requirements as tasked by higher authority -
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normally the intelligence representative (G-2/S-2) and the
MAGTF staff and/or the Fire Support Coordinator (FSC) in the
operation office (G-3/S-3). Upon mission assignment, the UAV
representative must coordinate with the Air Liaison Officer
(ALO), the Fire Support Coordinator (FSC), and several other
staff officers. After the request coordination, m uAily
Aircraft Tasking Order (ATO) is published by the G-3/S-3.
This order includes fixed-wing, rotary wing, and all UAV
missions anticipated to undertaken. [Ref. 4:p. 7]
b. Immediate Missions
Immediate UAV missions also occur in war.
Unrealized needs or quickly changing tactical situations
necessitate the use of "short fuse" missions that can best
fulfill requirements. Two primary methods are used to fulfill
these requirements:
"* Diversion of a UAV currently performing another mission,
usually preplanned, or
"* Initiating a new UAV mission by launching a UAV not
presently being employed - a stand-by UAV.
In the first method, the UAV is directed to a higher
priority or more immediate requirement. These UAVs can be
airborne or on the ground preparing for an operation. If the
initial requirement is not met then another mission must be
flown to fulfill the need or another collection platform
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tasked, or the requirement may go unfulfilled. None of these
is a great option, but one has to be chosen. In some
situations, a UAV can be launched toward the area of
interest/target area prior to the end of immediate mission
planning. This enables the detailed planning to be done while
the aircraft is traveling to the target. This technique
greatly enhances the reaction time of the mission.
(Ref. 5 :p. 7)
2. CLF Controlled UAV Operational Concept
CLF-controlled UAV operations have four distinct
phases: the tasking phase, planning/coordination phase,
execution phase and dissemination phase. These phases combine
to form a dynamic, coordinated, and intelligent command and
control process capable of executing a multitude of UAV
missions within the MAGTF. Figure 4 (Ref. 5:figure 2] shows
pictorial line diagrams of this command/operational concept.
a. Tasking Phase
In the tasking phase, requesting units route their
requests for fire support spotting and information through the
Intelligence/Air Liaison organization to the controlling
headquarters. It is important to note that the requesting
units are requesting information or a spotting capability, not
a UAV. The assignment of UAVs to the mission must be made at
the MAGTF so that a balance between platforms is reached to
optimize the capabilities of all the completing platforms.
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b. Planning Coordination Phase
In the planning and coordination phase, the
controlling headquarters (usually G-3) integrates the MAGTF
commander's guidance with all units' requests. During the
planning coordination phase, many requests will be passed to
other platforms or participating agencies by the commander,
while the remaining requests are screened as valid UAV
missions. Additionally, during this phase tht proposed
mission is initially coordinated with the Fire Support
Coordination Center to ensure Mortar/Naval Gunfire/Artillery
coordination if the UAV is flying beyond the Fire Support
Coordination Line (FSCL). The proposed mission must also be
coordinated through Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) to
ensure airspace deconfliction. The last thing to occur in the
planning/coordination phase is the issuing of the UAV mission
order. This parallel coordination ensures both that the
airspace and ground "pictures" have been coordinated and that
a conflict between UAVs and other platforms does not occur.
c. Execution Phase
In the Execution Phase of UAV operations, the Air
Liaison Officer and the UAV command representative continue to
coordinate extensively and continuously. This is the phase of
UAV operations which is most critical. This is where the UAV
is airborne and coordination is absolutely critical in a
mission. Mission accomplishment and safety are key points
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which must, on occasion, be balanced for maximum effect. Air
space deconfliction is essential for proper battle space
safety management. Friendly mid-air collisions are
unacceptable at any time including combat. It is essential
that all controlling agencies are aware of the UAV's flight
plan.
d. Dissemination Phase
During the Dissemination Phase of UAV operations,
live target information is linked to ground receiving stations
for immediate use or recording. The location of remote video
terminals is dependent on the mission type and priority. Each
operation/flight must be balanced against current requirements
and the tactical situation.
In an amphibious operation, there may be instances when
the CLF and his staff are still embarked, but his UAV assets
are capable of operations ashore. In these instances, the
operational concept described above still applies. The only
difference is that the CLF's command center is afloat instead
of ashore. The communication circuits that would be used
ashore are also available for the embarked staff.
Coordinating with the Navy becomes an additional burden for
these types of scenarios. It becomes imperative that air
space deconfliction and fire support control be maintained in
the Navy Marine Corps team.
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The operational concept described provides a logical
sequence to follow and to control UAVs effectively and safely.
It also ensures that the UAV mission is appropriately tasked
and controlled and that the information is disseminated
properly.
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VI. ISSUES OF UAVs IN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS
There are several critical issues that limit or alter the
effectiveness of the UAV system operating as an embarked unit
in support of an amphibious operation. This thesis will
discuss the three that the author feels are most important.
The foremost of these Command, Control and Communications (C3)
concerns is the issue of Electromagnetic Interference (EMI).
EMI in control links may cause a severe degradation of
capabilities or complete loss of aircraft. The second
critical C3 issue is the dissemination of the video proaucts
from the UAV. Without the timely transmission of intelligence
to the requesting unit, the mission can be considered a waste.
The last C3 critical issue is airspace management. Safe UAV
integration into coordinated airspace is essential. Other
activities will not want to operate in the same airspace if
the situation becomes unsafe due to UAV operations. The
purpose of this chapter is to explore in detail these C3 UAV
issues and possible solutions.
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A. FLECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE IN CONTROL LINKS
UAVs are much more reliant on the electromagnetic spectrum
than ordinary aircraft because of their electronic control
links. When these links are interfered with or cut, the UAV
can become lost or destroyed. In the best case, the UAV w•ill
initiate its lost signal return home sequence which will
interrupt the on-going mission. There are many reasons an
electronic link can be lost. This section will focus on the
electromagnetic interference.
EMI can be originated at many locations. A poorly
designed system can create its own EMI that renders the system
useless. Enemy jamming is another form of EMI. The last type
of EMI, and the one focused on in this report, is friendly
system EMI.
With the confined and overloaded electromagnetic spectrum
we currently work within, it is not uncommon to have different
systems operating within the same frequency ranges. The close
proximity of two frequencies can cause frequency interferences
due to spectrum overload. Spectrum overload occurs when two
signals have a portion of the signal overlapped with each
other. In some cases, even if the operative frequencies are
widely spaced, EMI can occur. This happens when one system's
power output is so great that it can impinge itself on the
cther systems' internal circuits. In the case of the UAVs
operating off amphibious ships, the cause of EMI is primarily
the ship's radars and communications systems.
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During May 1992, the Navy attempted to temporarily station
Pioneer UAVs on the USS New Orleans (LPH-II) for exercise
Tandem Thrust 1992. When UAV operations are conducted, the
flight deck must be secured for safety reasons. Because the
LPH is home to so many high value air assets (AV-8Bs and troop
helicopters), UAV missions in a multifaceted operation would
become prohibitively expensive in terms of time list to higher
priority missions. Therefore, the LPH is not the platform of
choice for UAV deployment; however, it was used due to
hardware arresting gear problems on Navy LPDs. At that time,
the arresting gear had not been modified from battleship use
to LPD use. The Pioneer uses a C-Oand uplink with a UHF
uplink backup and a single C-Band downlink. This is the same
frequency range as the proposed short-range "Hunter" UAV
system. [Ref. 4:p. 5-2]
During Tandem Thrust 1992, it was observed by Navy UAV
controllers that the AN/SPS-40 air search radar interfered
with the C-Band uplink of the Pioneer. Consequently, the SPS-
40 radar was secured during UAV operations. (Ref. 8:p. 13 The
securing of the AN/SPS-40 radar means that air threats are
possibly undetected. A further analysis was conducted to
isolate the cause and derive a possible solution to this
interference. When the Navy initiated the permanent
stationing of UAVs on LPD's, Navy engineers attempted to use
the Wave Form Recording and Playback System (WRAPS) to
mathematically analyze the frequency spectrum of the LPD.
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LPDs also had an AN/SPS-40 air search radar and it was feared
that a similar EMI problem would exist. The use of WRAPS
determined that the cause of the EMI was "case penetration" of
the C-Band control circuit on the UAV. An entire spectrum
analysis of LPH electromagnetic radiators and Pioneer
electronic gear was also done. The results are summarized in
Table 2. (Ref. 8:Appendix F:Enclosure 13 This chart indicated
where possible EMI problems exist in the frequency spectrum in
the Pioneer operating sub-system. The test engineers
recommended that additional shielding be applied to the
control circuits of the Pioneer in order to reduce EMI caused
interference by the AN/SPS-40. (Ref. 8:Appendix A:p.l]
In January 1993, the Navy had hardware arresting gear
problems solved by Patuxent River engineers and were prepared
to deploy a UAV attachment aboard an LPD. The USS Denver
(LPD-9) was chosen as the initiation/host amphibious ship.
The Denver was modified during the Spring of 1993 to
accommodate the Pioneer system package.
A three-phase test plan was developed in which EMI
problems were studied in a systematic manner along with other
systems such as arresting gear and antenna placement.
(Ref. 8:p. 5] During Phase I, EMI was tested while the UAV
was powered up and in the launch position. All radios and
radars were energized to check for EMI problems. If any
indications of interference were observed during a period when
any of the ship's emitters were activated, single emitters
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were secured for the isolation of the offending emitter. The
AN/SPS-40 radar was tested while at sea due to Navy
restrictions concerning energizing the radar while in port.
This test was done so that the point of UHF radar signal entry
into the UAVs' C-Band receiver could be isolated. All other
UAV controls (i.e. flight controls and engine RPM) listed in
Table 2 were also monitored for EMI responsible problems.
Phase II of the installation process involved flight
testing. In this phase, EMI checks were conducted with the
UAV flying within visual range of the ship while maintaining
the safeguards established in Phase I. If any EMI was
observed, the AN/SPS-40 radar was secured and additional
shielding was added to the UAV.
Phase III of the test plan emphasized an expanded airborne
testing with emphasis on operational capabilities. UAVs were
flown on simulated missions to check EMI existing in the
payload package of the downlink signal. If EMI was observed,
an offending emitter was secured for the duration of the
flight.
The results of this test plan were very encouraging. In
Phase I, no EMI was detected between the shipboard HF
transmitters and non AN/SPS-40 radars and the Pioneer system.
EMI was detected, however, between the AN/SPS-40 radar and the
Pioneer UHF secondary uplink when their frequencies were
within 10 MHz of each other. It is interesting to note that
there were no EMI problems between the AN/SPS-40 radar and the
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Pioneer as occurred on the New Orleans. Apparently, the
additional shielding that was recommended after that
deployment worked. [Ref. 9:p. 9]
During flight testing, no EMI problems existed when the
UAV was greater than 200 meters from the ship and 15 MHz
separation was maintained between the AN/SPS-40 and the
Pioneer UHF secondary control uplink. Consequently, the
AN/SPS-40 radar has to be secured during launch and recovery
operations until a more permanent solution can be developed in
the future. [Ref. 9:pp. 8-9] Many important lessons can be
learned from this testing. First, EMI considerations must be
included in the initial design stages. Admittedly, the
Pioneer system was never intended to fly off a ship, so the
current problems can be expected. However, in future UAV
systems, EMI problems should be minimized at all cost.
Secondly, a thorough analysis of the candidate host ship's
emitter spectrum and proposed UAV electronics package
vulnerabilities should eliminate these problems prior to
deployment. The WRAPS system is the perfect candidate to
perform this analysis. Proper integration into ships'
operating environment is a cornerstone of C3 interoperability
and system employment suitability. No system, such as the
AN/SPS-40, should have to be secured in a normal operating
situation when another system is operating. This increases
the ship's vulnerability due to a far less effective warning.
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B. OPERATIONAL VULNERABILITY TO VIDEO LINKS
UAV systems relay their raw intelligence data back to the
control unit via radio links. In the case of the Pioneer, and
its follow-on version, the Hunter, this is a C-Band line-of-
sight link. This means that the ship and UAV must remain
within a line of sight arrangement, or the video link will be
lost. If the unit requiring the imagery is located on the
same ship as the control unit, the imagery dissemination is
quite easy. The ship merely has to tap into the video output
at the control station and route onto the ship's own organic
video distribution system for the appropriate users.
The difficulty comes when the user is not on the same
vessel. In fact, the user may be ashore or in aerial transit.
The challenge then becomes to supply real-time video to the
appropriate user when not aboard the host ship. The Remote
Receiver Station (RRS) has theoretically solved a lot of this
problem.
The RRS has the remote television capability of receiving
an unprocessed real-time image from the aerial UAV. It has a
directional antenna that must be mounted in the line of sight
of the UAV. [Ref. 4:p. 3-9] In shipboard applications, this
means the antenna should be mounted as high on the mast as
possible for optimal reception. Once the signal has been
received and processed, the ship's own video distribution
system has the requirement to disseminate it internally. The
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RRS enables imagery customers who are in the line of sight to
receive their imagery directly.
In complex exercises, it is possible that several UAVs
will be flying and sending signal imagery at the same time.
It is also possible that there will be times in which
different images will be required by different units on the
same ship simultaneously. The current RRS does not have the
capability to serve multiple subscribers simultaneously.
A new system is needed that will satisfy this operational
void. The new system would require a high gain omni-
directional antenna with a multi-channel processor. The high
gain antenna is necessary to retain the video's high
definition image quality while operating at the UAV's maximum
ranges. The omni-directiznal antenna is necessary because
there may be two UAVs operating many miles apart from each
other serving different customers on the same ship
simultaneously. The multi-channel processor is required to
process different video signals from different frequencies at
the same time. The multi-channel processor would also be
required to input all desired received signals into the ship's
internal video distribution system.
One key point in multi-UAV operations becomes extremely
important. This point is the frequency allocations for each
control and data link on each UAV. These frequencies need to
be disseminated so that users will know which frequency to
tune to so he may receive their respective video. All this
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should be done during the planning and coordination phase of
UAV operations as discussed earlier.
Another key aspect of UAV operations is the dissemination
of data to ships out of range of the UAVs downlink or without
an RRS. Several different exploitation methods were
investigated during exercise Tandum Thrust-92. The first
method is the use of the limited secure voice radio to other
ships in the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG). The next method
used was the Teletype Intelligence Network, a slow message
service. The third method involves the use of a
Reconnaissance Exercise Report (RECCEXREP) by regular message
reporting channels. These first three methods of transmission
do not transmit imagery. These are all subject to the
interpretation of the radio operator. Clearly, much
timeliness and accuracy of the data is lost using these
methods.
The fourth method of data relay is through the use of
Fleet Imagery Support Terminal (FIST) broadcasts. The FIST
broadcast only transmits single frame pictures; therefore, the
customer loses the advantage of seeing a moving video image of
the intended target. The fifth and last method of data relay
is through the use of video recording equipment. The ground
control station video records the UAV missions onto commercial
video tape. At the termination of the mission, a helicopter
with the video recording is dispatched to the unit requesting
the information. The key problem with the video recording
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technique is the time lost while physically transporting the
video tape. consequently, decisions regarding tactical
operations will be made with information that is possibly
several hours old. (Ref. 9:pp. 6-7]
In summary, the Navy needs to develop a robust video relay
system capable of securely sending video images over
significant distances to various ships. This new system would
also need to be integrated with the Joint Intelligence Center
(JIC) through the command vessel and into the various database
systems.
C. AIR SPACE MANAGEMENT
Air space management is always a difficult task in any
modern battle space. The combination of close air support,
fighter cover, helicopter transits and artillery fire provide
a difficult deconfliction problem. UAVs add an additional and
unique burden to this complex situation.
By nature, UAVs do not have internal pilots. The ground-
stationed pilot does not have the advantage of being on board
with the natural human senses and width of view. He does not
have the ability to quickly change his azimuth of view and re-
focus on new objects. This creates a very dangerous situation
for the other pilots in the air. The UAV's small size and
limited visual "senses" can become significant factors leading
to midair collisions and, possibly, loss of life. To avoid
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this, a UAV concept of operation must include a reliable,
timely and accurate integration of UAV operations in the air
space management scheme. The UAV cperational scheme
illustrated in Figure 5 provides for such coordination. By
coordinating earlier in the planning stages with both the fire
support agencies and air control agencies, UAV operations are
accounted for in their respective schemes of maneuver. Later
in the UAV operational scheme, the fire support agencies and
air control agencies are constantly being updated regarding
UAV position, heading and anticipated movements. This type of
continuous information flow is essential if the air space is
to remain safe and predictable for all concerned.
The three critical issues discussed above are not the only
issues confronting UAV employment in amphibious operations.
They represent the three most important that the author feels
need to be address. A more comprehensive list is provided in
the summary and recommendation chapter to follow. The three
issues discussed above represent a sever degradation of
vehicle and consequently mission performance if they are not
solved.
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VII. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This thesis investigated the concept of using UAVs in
amphibious operations from amphibious ships. This thesis
described a generic UAV, stated the threats to UAVs in hostile
environments, stated the missions that UAVs are capable of,
detailed the integration of UAVs in the amphibious warfare
concept and also discussed several critical C3 issues. The
issue of stationing UAVs on amphibious ships is not as simple
as saying its a good idea and then doing it. There are many
trade offs that need to be considered.
The first point that needs to be stated very clearly is
that, yes, UAVs would greatly enhance the commander's war
fighting capability in amphibious warfare in circumstances
where extreme danger exists to friendly forces. Because of
the extreme inherent danger and the need for immediate
accurate intelligence during amphibious operations, UAVs could
provide a much needed service to the commanders which is
currently not available. Therefore, a trade-off points exists
in which the use of conventional manned assets becomes too
risky and the use of UAVs, Pven with its inherent weakness,
becomes desirable. There exists a certain point in which the
cost of conducting normal manned operations becomes too
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expensive when compared to UAV operations. It should be
clearly stated that UAVs possess a high overhead cost (e.g,
set-up time, launch time, recovery time) and lack the
flexibility of manned systems. This kind of analysis was not
the subject of this thesis, but is necessary in order to
optimize the entire force structure under the commanders
control. It is recommended that a study regarding this trade-
off be conducted.
The list below provides additional areas of research that
needed to be conducted but were not discussed in Chapter VI.
This list is not exhaustive. It only provides a starting
point for future research in this field.
"* A trade-off analysis of space requirements of manned
aircraft vs UAVs on amphibious ships
"* What other activities onboard a ship need to be altered
during UAV operations
"• Storage problems of UAV AVGAS fuel
"• Rocket Assisted Take-off (RATO) storage and signature
plume
"* A feasibility study to determine if the proposed short
range UAV is capable of landing on a LPD equipped with a
net arresting gear in light of its excessive weight and
wing span.
"* Time required to set up, fly, take down the UAV system on
ship
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These issues need to be addressed in order to have a complete
understanding regarding the cost and benefits of doing UAV
operations in amphibious warfare.
47
LIST OF REFERENCES
1. United States Marine Corps, Marine Cors Combat
Development Command, Draft FMFM 3-22-1 UAV Company
Operations, 1993
2. Depaltment of Defense, Joint Program Office Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Master Plan 1993.
3. Department of the Navy, Unmanned Air Vehicle (UAV) Prcgram
Memorandum, 8 Arc 1993
4. United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Development and
Education Command, OH 2-2 Remotely piloted Vehicle
Employment, 1987.
5. United States Marine Corps, Draft Copy, Concept of
Employment for the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle-Short Range,
1993.
6. United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Combat
Development Command, Draft Operational Maneuver From The
Sea, 1993.
7. Kyle, William, "Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Concept of
Employment Brief", briefing prepared for Commanding
General, Marine Corps Combat Development Center, Quantico,
VA, Feb 93.
8. Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division Project Report
Plan 1389, Pioneer/LPD Integration Testing, by S. Fischer,
13 April 1993.
9. Commander Aviation Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division,
Pioneer Unmanned Air Vehicle (UAV) Flight Tests Aboard USS





1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria VA 22304-6145
2. Library, Code 052 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey CA 93943-5002
3. Director for Command, Control and 1
Communications Systems, Joint Staff
Washington, DC 20318-6000
4. C3 Academic Group, Code CC 1
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5000
5. Commandant of the Marine Corps Code TE-06 1
Headquarters USMC
Washington, DC 20360-0001
6. Superintendent, Code OR/SM 7
Attn: Prof. Michael G. Sovereign
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5000
7. Dr. Y. S. Fu 1
DISA/JIEO/TAB
11440 ISAAC Newton Sq.
Reston, VA 22090
49
